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STATE OF UTAH 




MICHAEL DALE GILL, 11783 
Def endant-A.ppellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the Defendant, 
J!Iichael Dale Gill was charged with the crime of robbery 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 51, Section 1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, by information filed in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah on December 15, 1967. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The Defendant was tried before a jury, commencing 
June :2, 1969, before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux. The 
Defendant was found guilty by verdict of the jury, entered 
June 3, 1969, of the crime of robbery and sentenced to con-
finement in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Gill seeks a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 4, 1967, Harman's Take-Home Cafe, 1, 
cated in Salt Lake City, Utah, was robbed by two m,, 




Of three employee-:; on duty, only two were called a.i 
witnesses by the State (Tr. 5, 22). The State's first \fr 
ness, Marilyn Marx identified the Defendant as one of th, 
two men involved in the robbery (Tr. 22), but acknowi-. 
edged that she had difficulty distinguishing the identifying 
characteristics of Defendant when compared with thoS€ 0r 
the Defendant's brother, James Gill (Tr. 21). A third 11i\-
1 
ne&3 in behalf of the State, who purported to have accom-
panied the Defendant at the time of the robbery (Tr. 31-
32), while describing the incident, used the name "Jim" 
when referring to the Defendant (Tr. 31). 
There was considerable variance in the testimony of 
the State's witnesses as to what the Defendant was pur-
ported to have worn at the time of the incident (Tr. 15-16. 
38). 
For the defense, the Defendant's brother, James Gill 
testified thait he and his brother David Gill were the par-
ticipants in the robbery, and that Michael Gill was not 
present at any time (Tr. 43). This testimony was corrobor-
ated by the testimony of David Gill (Tr. 52). 
Defense counsel attempted to cross-examine the em· 
ployee, Marilyn Marx as to her identification of the Def en· 
J 
,!:int as a p:U'ticipant in the robbery and as to her knowl-
,:dge of the Defendant's name. Upon objection by the prose-
Ltition, this line of inquiry was cut short: 
''Q. When did you first learn the name of the 
Defendant, Mike Gill? 
"A. When we were, oh, in the line-up. 
"Q. And this is the line-up that the police took 
you to for identification purposes? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did the police tell you that Mike Gill waog 
in that line-up. 
"MR. FREDERICK: I will object to the form 
of the question - anything the police may have told 
her, I think, is not material; be hearsay at this point. 
"MR. HANSEN: I will submit it. 
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
''Q. Who was present at the line-up? 
"A. The - let's see - the three men that 
robbed me; the two, the first time; and the two, the 
second time; and one did it twice. 
"Q. And what were their names? 
"A. The Gill brothers; I don't really know 
which one it is, except I know the name is 'Mike 
Gill,' becau'Se I have read about it in the paper. 
"Q. You don't know, really, which one it is. 
what-
"A. I don't know which one is James or -
but I know he is Mike Gill. 







At the line-up, I think they read off : , 
That's right; the police told you so, die:. 
Yes. 
"Q. And do you recall the names of the Polit, 
that were there? 
"A. I know Elton was there; he is the one tlw 
come down to inv&Stigate that night, that I 118, 
robbed. 
"Q. You know any others that were at tht 
line-up? 
"A. No. 
''Q. And, in this line-up there weren't any 
Mexicans, were there? 
"MR. FREDERICK: Your Honor, I am 
to object how the line-up - No. 1, has gone bey0M 
the scope of direct examination; it isn't relevant ti 
this matter. 
"THE COURT: Objection is sustained; beyonc! 
the scope. 
"Q. In this line-up, there were no negroes, 
were there? 
"MR. FREDERICK: Make the same objection. 
your Honor. 
"THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
"Q. In this line-up, there were no more than 
"THE COURT: Now, listen; objection to this 
type of qu&Stion is isustained, and don't ask any , 
like that. 
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":\IR \Vould you identify my lim-
its. your Honor? 
"THE COURT: Yes; you understand the lim-
its, very well. 
"MR. HANSEN : I am asking for instruction 
from the Court; I do not - I think I am entitled 
to go into this. 
"THE COURT: The Court instructs you, it is 
beyond the scope of the direct testimony; and the 
objection is sustained; and don't go into it, any 
more. 
"MR. HANSEN: Does this mean the entire 
circumstances surrounding the line-up? 
"THE COURT: Entire circumstances sur-
rounding the line-up; you may call the witness as 
your own witness, if you choose; this is beyond the 
scope of the direct testimony" (Tr. 12-14). 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PER-
MIT DEFENSE COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAM-
THE STATE'S WITNESS ON THE BASIS 
FOR HER IDENTIFICATION OF DEFEN-
DANT. 
Identification is almost always a matter of opinion. 
Stafr' v. CJwnibers, 104 Ariz. 247, 451 P. 2d 27 (1969); 
State v. Sutton, 272 Minn. 399, 138 N. W. 2d 46 (1965); 
State v. Linzia, 412 S. W. 2d 116 (Mo. 1967). 
Thus, when a witness testifies that an in6dent oc-
cmTed, and that a given person was involved in the inci-
ctent, the witness is in reality saying that the fact of the 
incident occ:urred and that, based upon what the · 
WI tile<: 
was able to and did observe, it is the opinion of the ,,itnt1. 
that the person identified is the same pePSon involved , 
the incident. Such opinions, ru:; all testimonial opinio"s '.. 
l! ' a,e 
open to the test of cross-examination not only as to n. 
competency of the witness to form the opinion - as tr, 
what the witness saw and was able to see, but also as to th, 
validity and credibility of the facts forming the basis n; 
the opinion - as to whether the purported facts upon which 
the opinion is based in reality occurred. State v. Peek, 1 · 
U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953); State v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 
34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959). 
When the question of identity is directly in issue, as 
it was here, the widest breadth of cross-examination should 1 
be permitted to test not only the weight and credibility of 
the identification but, as importantly, to test the compe-
tency of the witness to arrive at that identification. This ' 
is particularly so, as a matter of basic and fundamental 
justice, when the question directly in issue is one of identit)· 
of the accused. The cornerstone nature of the right to so 
cross-examine is reflected in the constitutionally secured 
prerogaitive to appear and defend and be confronted by the 
witness testifying against an accused (Constitution of Utah 
Article I section 12), for as this Court, itself, has said, the 
right of croos-examinartion is inherent in the right of con-
frontation of and by witnesses. State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 
505, 57 Pac. 542 (1899). See also People v. Hume, 56 C. A. 
2d 262, 132 P. 2d 52 (1943); Archina v. Proplc, 135 Colo. 
8, 307 P. 2d 1083 (1957); State v . . Merritt, 66 Nev. 380, 
212 P. 2d 706 (1949). 
7 
.\t the trial helow, there can be no doubt but that the 
of this Defendant as one of the participants in the 
1 ,>1. 1wry was squarely at issue. The Defendant's brothers 
Ii·" :c<i ,·ip;] thclt tl:ey and not the Defendant were the 
parties to the crime. The State's own witness acknowledged 
the difficulty in distinguishing between the Defendant and 
:: 
1 >ndte1· J:n:1es, and the purported accomplice, Linda 
Ft"lnnal. with a significant siip of the tongue, indicated 
t:::'. it: .,1·as James Gill anct not the Defendant who was the 
c1i-j1erpctrntor. A major portion of Marilyn :Marx's testi-
m .,: ,. :n: clii·e;_ t examination was devoted to identifying the 
Defl·ntlan.t (Tr. 8-11). 
Ti10 of the subject line of questioning then goes to 
the fundamental inquiry to be made of every identification 
Whether the witness was able to identify the suspect 
of her own knowledge and based upon her own observation; 
or ,,·hether, in fact, the witness's identification of the de-
fendant \ms predicated upon what the police or others had 
t 1>ld her. the nature of the line-up and the manner in which 
it was conducted, or other information which the identify-
ing ''ritness obtained second-hand \\·hich tainted her identi-
fication by suggestive implication and innuendo and which 
forced her to a testimonial conclusion at which she would 
not otherwise have been able to arrive. 
\Vith the trial in this posture, the Court should have 
pennitted defense counsel the greatest leeway in cross-ex-
amining l\forib·n Marx on her identification of the Defen-
dant. 
8 
Information r;ainrd at th(' linr-up may well hai·r 
the sole p1wlicatc upon ll'hich thP witness based hc1· idnit .. 
fication. 
But instead, the Court cut short this highly german, 
and relevant inquiry on the ground that such examinatir)n 
was beyond the scope of direct examination (Tr. 14). 
We submit that such circumscription of defense coun . 
.sel's right to cross-examine on a matter directly in i'Ssue 
1 
was irreparably prejudicial to this Defendant, and effec-
tively suspended his right to meaningfully confront the 
primary and chief witness against him and to test the com. 
petency and credibiliity of her opinion. 
The principles enunciated in State v. Peek, supra, a 
case dealing with cross-examination of expert witnes-ses to 
test therir opinions, are equally applicable to the present 
case. This Court stated: 
"There is no other instrument so well <Jdapted 
to discovery of the truth as c1·oss-examination, and 
as long as it tends to disclose the truth it sh0uld 
never be curtailed or limited. Any inquiry should 
be allowed which an individual about to buy \\·ould 
feel it in his interest to make." 
The Court went on to hold that: 
"Cross-examination of an opinion witness may 
embrace an investigation of the qualifications of the 
witness rhis competency to arrive at an opinion!· 
the extent of his knowledge, reasons for his opinion. 
and the factors upon which his opinion is based.'' 
See alw Stc•te v. Ward, Sll]Jrn. In a<lrlressing itself to the 
scope of cross-examination, the Comt, in Peek, held that: 
9 
''A witness may be asked on cross-examination 
any facts which would be admiso:;ible on direct ex-
amination * * *." (Emphasis added.) 
Ewn it' it were a·ssumed that the matter of identifica-
tion ,1·as beyond the scope of direct examination, in which 
t'\'t<llt the State would not have m'.lde its case, it is indisput-
,1,,Je that the right of cross-examination extends beyond the 
limits of direct examination when testing the credibility of 
"·itness as to his opinion or when attempting to impeach 
the testimony of the witness. And defense counsel's attack 
here was predicated upon both testing witness's competency 
to make such an identification and impeachment of her 
credibility. 
Inasmuch as the testimony of a witness is not stronger 
than where it is left on cross-examination, Oberg v. Sand-
1•1...:, 111 Utah 507, 184 P. 2d 229 (1947); and since the jury 
rnulrl neve1· know what the ·witness would have testified if 
defense counsel had been permitted to pursue his cross-
examination; and when the effect of the absence of such 
testimony on the jury verdict cannot be measured or 
wt>ig-hed, this Court, as it has done in the past should find 
prejudicial error and grant Defendant a new trial. State 
v. Po('. 21 U. 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512 (1968). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial Court erred 
prejudicially in refusing to permit defense counsel to fully 
10 
cross-examine the State's witness to test her identification 
of the Defendant. 
Accordingly, it iis urged that this Court grant a new 
trial. 
RespectfuHy submitted, 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
